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How	Brexit	could	harm	African	economies	that	trade
with	the	UK	and	disrupt	regional	integration
The	UK	must	pay	urgent	attention	to	the	complexities	of	African	trade	in	order	to	avoid	Brexit
having	damaging	effects,	explains	Peg	Murray-Evans.	Failure	to	do	so	could	mean	new	barriers
to	trade	from	vulnerable	African	economies	and	disruption	to	regional	integration.
In	a	previous	blog	I	outlined	my	concern	that	despite	the	UK	government’s	commitment	to
reinvigorating	the	Commonwealth,	African	countries	would	be	sidelined	in	favour	of	larger	and
more	important	markets	in	the	UK’s	post-Brexit	‘Global	Britain’	trade	strategy.	It	has	been	almost	exactly	a	year
since	that	post	and	the	recent	visit	to	South	Africa	and	Namibia	by	Lord	Price	marks	the	first	trip	to	Africa	by	a
Department	for	International	Trade	minister	since	the	department	was	created.	Lord	Price	met	with
representatives	of	the	five	members	of	the	Southern	African	Customs	Union	(SACU)	–	Botswana,	Lesotho,
Namibia,	South	Africa	and	Swaziland	–	plus	Mozambique.
The	southern	African	region	encapsulates	a	number	of	the	complexities	and	dilemmas	that	the	UK	faces	in
designing	a	trade	policy	that	will	support	the	development	needs	of	its	African	partners,	as	well	as	developing
countries	elsewhere.	So	what	is	at	stake	in	trade	talks	with	the	region?
Like	most	African	countries,	the	five	members	of	SACU	plus	Mozambique	currently	enjoy	preferential	access	to
the	EU	market	for	their	exports.	These	countries	are	members	of	an	Economic	Partnership	Agreement	(EPA),
which	gives	them	duty	and	quota	free	access	to	the	EU	(except	in	the	case	of	South	Africa,	which	faces	some
tariffs	and	quotas).	When	the	UK	exits	the	EU	it	will	cease	to	be	party	to	this	agreement	and	the	southern	African
countries	will	lose	their	preferential	access	to	the	UK	market	unless	alternative	arrangements	are	put	in	place.
The	UK	government	has	already	guaranteed	that	it	will	secure	existing	duty-free	access	to	its	market	for	48	Least
Developed	Countries	(LDCs)	by	replicating	the	EU’s	‘Everything	but	Arms’	scheme.	This	means	that	market
access	for	southern	African	LDCs	–	Lesotho	and	Mozambique	–	is	secure.	Since	the	other	countries	in	the	region
are	not	LDCs,	their	position	is	more	uncertain.	These	countries	would	face	a	tariff	increase	on	key	exports	like
beef	(from	Botswana)	and	grapes,	citrus	fruits	and	wine	(from	South	Africa)	if	current	market	access	were	not
replicated.
One	way	to	preserve	current	levels	of	access	to	the	UK	market	for	all	southern	African	countries	is	to	negotiate	a
free	trade	agreement	that	replicates	the	existing	EPA.	However	the	dynamics	of	the	southern	African	region
mean	that	this	is	not	a	straightforward	option.	Because	SACU	is	a	customs	union	with	a	common	external	tariff	it
can	only	negotiate	with	the	UK	as	a	bloc.	Levels	of	export	dependence	on	the	UK	market	vary	significantly	within
the	group	–	the	UK’s	share	of	Botswana’s	global	exports	was	13.5	per	cent	between	2013	and	2016,	whereas	this
figure	was	only	0.1	per	cent	for	Lesotho.	This	means	that	some	members	of	the	group	may	feel	a	more	urgent
need	to	secure	access	to	the	UK	market	than	others.	Furthermore,	different	approaches	to	trade	policy	within	the
region	have	caused	political	tensions	in	previous	negotiations.
The	region	is	further	complicated	by	the	presence	of	South	Africa,	which	is	considered	a	developed	country	by
the	World	Trade	Organisation.	As	a	result,	South	African	exports	to	the	EU	including	wine	and	fruit	are	subject	to
quotas	under	the	existing	EPA.	These	were	a	controversial	part	of	the	original	negotiations	and	would	have	to	be
renegotiated	in	order	to	replicate	the	deal	with	the	UK.	Furthermore,	if	the	UK	wants	to	negotiate	a	more
ambitious	trade	agreement	with	SACU	–	for	example	by	including	issues	such	as	services	and	investment	–	it	is
likely	to	meet	resistance	from	South	Africa,	whose	government	wishes	to	consolidate	regional	rules	on	these
issues	before	discussing	them	with	third	parties.
British Politics and Policy at LSE: How Brexit could harm African economies that trade with the UK and disrupt regional integration Page 1 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2017-07-30
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/brexit-risks-and-african-trade/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/
African	regional	trade	is	made	more	complex	still	by	the	overlap	between	regional	organizations	with	competing
agendas.	The	membership	of	SACU	overlaps	with	the	larger	Southern	African	Development	Community	(SADC)
and	Common	Market	for	Eastern	and	Southern	Africa	(COMESA),	both	of	which	exist	within	ongoing	efforts	to
conclude	a	Continental	Free	Trade	Agreement	that	would	include	all	54	members	of	the	African	Union.	Former
Minister	for	Africa,	James	Duddridge	MP,	suggested	at	this	month’s	Department	for	International	Trade	questions
that	the	UK	could	aim	to	use	trade	relations	with	Africa	to	help	strengthen	intra-continental	African	trade.	An
examination	of	the	EU’s	experiences	negotiating	the	EPAs,	however,	suggests	that	using	free	trade	negotiations
to	attempt	to	consolidate	incomplete	African	regional	projects	is	an	extremely	difficult	task.	On	the	other	hand	if
the	UK	chooses	not	to	take	a	continental	approach	and	instead	replicates	the	existing	patchwork	of	EPAs	and
other	EU	trade	arrangements	across	Africa,	this	is	likely	to	add	to	existing	barriers	to	intra-continental	free	trade.
An	alternative	to	the	current	EU	patchwork	of	arrangements	has	been	mooted	by	a	group	of	British	international
development	NGOs.	They	argue	that	the	UK	should	adopt	a	scheme	similar	to	Everything	but	Arms,	but	expand
its	eligibility	beyond	LDCs	to	all	‘economically	vulnerable	countries’.	The	problem	with	this	is	that	if	such	an
arrangement	included	small	middle-income	African	economies	like	Botswana,	it	could	be	open	to	legal	challenge
under	WTO	rules	by	larger	economies	at	similar	levels	of	development	like	India	and	Brazil.	Meanwhile	if	the	UK
chose	to	extend	unilateral	preferences	to	all	middle-income	countries	including	agricultural	market	leaders	like
Brazil,	then	beef	producers	in	Botswana	and	Namibia	would	lose	their	preferential	margin	and	it	is	unlikely	they
would	be	able	to	compete	in	the	UK	market.
There	are	also	more	straightforward	ways	that	the	UK	could	improve	market	access	for	countries	in	southern
Africa.	Simplifying	the	rules	of	origin	–	criteria	that	govern	the	designated	origin	of	a	product	–	for	manufactured
goods	like	garments	could	help	exporters	from	countries	like	Lesotho	to	access	the	UK	market.	The	UK	could
also	eliminate	non-tariff	barriers	to	trade	in	products	like	citrus	fruits	from	South	Africa	by	removing	the	EU’s	strict
controls	in	relation	to	the	fungal	infection	citrus	black	spot,	which	have	been	seen	as	a	controversial	protectionist
measure	by	South	African	citrus	exporters.	Changes	to	the	UK	food	safety	regime	would,	however,	create	new
trade	barriers	with	the	EU.
A	number	of	the	complexities	and	dilemmas	facing	UK	trade	with	southern	Africa	–	varying	levels	of	dependence
on	the	UK	market,	uneven	eligibility	for	unilateral	preference	schemes,	complex	regional	configurations,
vulnerability	to	competition	from	larger	middle-income	economies	–	exist	across	the	African	continent.	These
issues	require	urgent	attention	if	the	UK	government	is	to	ensure	that	Brexit	does	not	adversely	affect	developing
economies	in	Africa	and	elsewhere.
In	particular,	following	on	from	the	ministerial	trip	to	southern	Africa	this	week	the	UK	government	should	urgently:
1.	 engage	with	all	developing	countries	that	currently	have	preferential	access	to	the	EU	market	well	in
advance	of	the	end	of	the	Article	50	negotiating	period;
2.	 explore	the	legal	options	for	alternatives	to	the	current	patchwork	of	EPAs	and	other	preferential	trade
schemes	as	well	as	ways	of	addressing	non-tariff	barriers	to	trade	with	developing	countries;
3.	 acknowledge	the	complexities	of	African	regional	integration	and	investigate	ways	to	minimize	disruption
caused	by	post-Brexit	trade	arrangements;
4.	 carefully	assess	the	impact	of	new	trade	arrangements	with	other	developing	countries	on	those	that	benefit
from	existing	trade	agreements	and	preferences.
If	the	UK	now	moves	swiftly	to	take	these	four	steps	and	acknowledges	the	complexities	of	African	trade	then
they	could	avoid	Brexit	having	damaging	effects.	Failure	to	do	so	could	mean	new	barriers	to	trade	from
vulnerable	African	economies	and	disruption	to	African	regional	integration.
______
Note:	this	article	was	first	published	on	SPERI.
About	the	Author
British Politics and Policy at LSE: How Brexit could harm African economies that trade with the UK and disrupt regional integration Page 2 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2017-07-30
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/brexit-risks-and-african-trade/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/
Peg	Murray-Evans	is	Research	Associate	in	the	Department	of	Politics	at	the	University	of	York.
Her	research	on	South	Africa’s	place	in	global	politics	is	funded	with	a	Leverhulme	Early	Career
Fellowship.
	
Featured	image	credit:	Pixabay/Public	Domain.
British Politics and Policy at LSE: How Brexit could harm African economies that trade with the UK and disrupt regional integration Page 3 of 3
	
	
Date originally posted: 2017-07-30
Permalink: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/brexit-risks-and-african-trade/
Blog homepage: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/
